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‘Take Up Your Cross’ 
Public Theology between Populism and Pluralism in the Post-Migrant Context 
 
Abstract: As of 1 June 2018, the symbol of the cross has to be shown in all state offices of 
Bavaria in Germany. The government decree has stirred up controversy. In order to chart the 
churches’ response to this cross controversy, I return to a conversation between Robert N. 
Bellah and Martin E. Marty that was crucial to the study of religion in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Drawing on the core concepts of this conversation in which Marty coined the combination of 
‘public’ with ‘theology’, I analyze and assess the cross controversy as a case of what I call the 
populist predicament. I argue that the programme of public theology that Marty proposed 
provides a path out of the populist predicament because it combines celebration and critique of 
the identity of a country. Ultimately, I advance Marty’s programme by advocating for a pluralist 
position of public theology in the post-migrant context. 
 
As of 1 June 2018, the symbol of the cross has to be shown in all offices of the state of Bavaria 
in the Federal Republic of Germany.1 According to Head of State, Markus Söder, the cross 
symbolizes ‘Bavarian identity’: by decree, it is to be displayed in the entrances of all offices ‘as 
a visible confession to the fundamental values of the legal and social order of Bavaria’.2 Söder 
certainly made such a confession when he hung up a cross in the entrance of his office soon 
after the decision had been made. After the snapshot was shared widely in online and offline 
media,3 the decree was confronted with critique from both the political left and the political 
right. How can a cross stir up so much controversy? 
 The cross controversy is paradigmatic of post-migrant contexts.4 These contexts are 
characterized by the conflictual negotiations and the continuous re-negotiations of identity that 
occur once on-going migration has been acknowledged or accepted as a characteristic of a 
                                                        
1 If not stated otherwise, all translations from primary and secondary literature in German are my own. 
2 See the minutes of the meeting in which the cabinet decided on the decree, ‘Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung 
vom 24. April 2018’, available at http://bayern.de/bericht-aus-der-kabinettssitzung-vom-24-april-2018, para. 1-2 
[last accessed 12 May 2018]. 
3 Markus Söder posted the snapshot on twitter. It is available at 
https://twitter.com/Markus_Soeder/status/988768341820170240 [last accessed 12 May 2018]. 
4 Throughout, I refer to Naika Foroutan’s conceptualization of post-migrant societies. She stresses that the prefix 
‘post’ does not point to the end of migration. Instead, it indicates that migration is acknowledged or accepted as a 
central characteristic of the societies in question so that conversations about its causes, configurations, and 
consequences for the identity of the country are required. In these conversations, both the defenders and the 
despisers of migration have a say. For empirical explorations of the post-migrant society of Germany, see the 
trilogy by Naika Foroutan, Coskun Canan, Sina Arnold, Benjamin Schwarze, Steffen Beigang, and Dorina 
Kalkum, Deutschland postmigrantisch I: Gesellschaft, Religion, Identität (Berlin: Berliner Institut für empirische 
Migrations- und Integrationsforschung, 2014); Naika Foroutan, Coskun Canan, Benjamin Schwarze, Steffen 
Beigang, and Dorina Kalkum, Deutschland postmigrantisch II: Einstellungen von Jugendlichen und jungen 
Erwachsenen zu Gesellschaft, Religion und Identität (Berlin: Berliner Institut für empirische Migrations- und 
Integrationsforschung, 2015); and Coskun Canan and Naika Foroutan, Deutschland postmigrantisch III: 
Migrantische Perspektiven auf deutsche Identitäten. Einstellungen von Personen mit und ohne 
Migrationshintergrund zu nationaler Identität in Deutschland (Berlin: Berliner Institut für empirische Migrations- 
und Integrationsforschung, 2016). 




country. Considering the currency and the centrality of post-migration contexts across 
contemporary Europe,5 it is crucial to study how churches comport themselves under these 
conditions. Based in Bavaria, the representatives of the two German mainline churches, 
Archbishop Reinhard Marx, representing Catholicism in Germany, and Bishop Heinrich 
Bedford-Strohm, representing Protestantism in Germany, were among the most cautious and 
the most careful critics of the decree to display crosses. In what follows, I will take their 
criticisms as concrete cases in order to chart the contours of a public theology for the post-
migrant context.  
 Methodologically, I will return to a conversation between Robert N. Bellah and Martin 
E. Marty that held the study of religion in suspense during the 1960s and the 1970s. The 
conversation in which Marty coined the curious combination of ‘public’ with ‘theology’ (and 
of ‘theology’ with ‘public’) centred on the categories of ‘civil religion’ and ‘confessional 
religion’.6 Today, these categories are particularly pertinent because, analytically, they 
undermine the strict separation of religion from culture and of culture from religion that is 
persistently presumed in the public square. Applying the categories of civil and confessional 
religion to the cross controversy, I will analyze and assess the decree as a case of what I call 
the ‘populist predicament’. By ‘populist predicament’, I mean the problematic position 
churches are put in when populists lay claim to Christianity because it confronts theologians 
with the plight both to criticize and to confirm the significance of Christianity for the identity 
of the country. Can they square the circle? I will argue that the programme of public theology 
that Marty proposed in his conversation with Bellah provides a promising path out of the 
populist predicament because it allows churches to both criticize and confirm the significance 
of Christianity for the identity of the country. Advancing Marty’s programme, I will advocate 
for a pluralist position of public theology in the post-migrant context. Only if it presents the 
significance of both Christian and non-Christian religions for the construction of the identity of 
a country, has public theology the potential to provoke and preserve the negotiations and the 
re-negotiations of identity that post-migrant contexts require. 
                                                        
5 See the contributions concentrating on the ‘constellations’ and on the ‘conflicts’ of the current so-called refugee 
crisis in Ulrich Schmiedel and Graeme Smith, eds, Religion in the European Refugee Crisis (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018), pp. 15-120; 123-224. 
6 Martin E. Marty, ‘Two Kinds of Two Kinds of Civil Religion’, in Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, eds., 
American Civil Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 139-157. References to the study in which Marty 
coined this curious combination run through almost all accounts of public theology. See especially the concise but 
comprehensive exploration by E. Harold Breitenberg, Jr., ‘To Tell the Truth: Will the Real Public Theology Please 
Stand Up?’, Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 23:2 (2003), pp. 55-96. However, given that Marty’s 
programme of public theology is normally neither analyzed nor assessed in these accounts, his study is arguably 
more often referenced than read. 




1 Interpreting the Cross Controversy with Robert Bellah  
 
Robert N. Bellah’s seminal study, ‘Civil Religion in America’, published in Daedalus in 1967, 
had a significant impact on the theological and the non-theological study of religion.7 Bellah 
popularized the concept of ‘civil religion’ in contrast to ‘confessional religion’. Discussing 
Bellah’s central category, I will analyze the decree to display crosses in the state offices of 
Bavaria as a case of ‘uncivil’ rather than ‘civil’ religion.8 In the post-migrant context, I will 
argue, the cross is claimed for the construction of identity in order to distinguish the insider 
from the outsider who is identified here with Islam. The decree displays the claim to Christianity 
so characteristic of contemporary populist politics. 
 What is civil religion? Bellah borrows the concept from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The 
Social Contract.9 He suggests that there are two types of religion: the type of ‘confessional 
religion’ that is tied to specific ecclesial institutions and the type of ‘civil religion’ that is not 
tied to specific ecclesial institutions. Both require ‘the same care in understanding’.10 President 
John F. Kennedy’s inauguration is Bellah’s empirical example for the civil in contrast to the 
confessional role of religion. Bellah is struck by the repeated reference to God. Since ‘God’ is 
a concept that ‘almost all Americans can accept’, Bellah suggests, it connects Christians and 
non-Christians.11 Kennedy knew how significant coherence is in a ‘nation of immigrants’.12 
But despite his repeated reference to God, Bellah stresses, he acknowledged the separation of 
the churches from the state and of the state from the churches. ‘Considering the separation’, 
Bellah asks, ‘how is a president justified in using the word “God” at all?’13 The answer is that 
the justification of the president comes with a civil-religious rather than a confessional-religious 
                                                        
7 Robert N. Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, Daedalus 96:1 (1967), pp. 1-21. Bellah’s study was reprinted in 
Richey and Jones, eds, American Civil Religion. In their introduction, the editors suggest scholarly and social 
reasons for the success of Bellah’s category. See Russel E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, ‘The Civil Religion 
Debate’, in Richey and Jones, eds, American Civil Religion, pp. 3-20. Bellah developed and discussed his category 
especially in Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1975); Robert N. Bellah and Philip E. Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1980), and also Robert N. Bellah, Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditionalist 
World (Berkley: University of California Press, 1991). 
8 As will become clear below, I distinguish ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ religion according to the concept of cohesion that 
is implied or intended by them. Bellah interprets these concepts differently. See Robert E. Bellah and Frederick E. 
Greenspahn, eds, Uncivil Religion: Interreligious Hostility in America (New York: Crossroads, 1987). 
9 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Christopher Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
158-167. 
10 Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, p. 1. 
11 Ibid., p. 3. 
12 See John F. Kennedy’s posthumously published A Nation of Immigrants. Introduction by Edward M. Kennedy. 
Foreword by Abraham A. Foxman (New York: Harper Perennial, 2017). 
13 Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, p. 3. 




understanding of the word.14 If Bellah’s categories destabilize the well-worn demarcation of 
religion from culture and culture from religion, then, what is the difference? Although Kennedy 
was a Christian, Bellah maintains, the God of his address could be accepted by Christians and 
non-Christians alike. Accordingly, Kennedy claimed public civil religion rather than private 
confessional religion at his inauguration. Bellah admits that the civil-religious (in contrast to 
the confessional-religious) concept of God ‘means so many different things to so many different 
people that it is almost an empty sign’, but argues that the emptiness of the sign is significant.15 
Because of the multiple meanings of the symbol of God, the symbol can represent almost all 
Americans. 
 Although acceptable to almost all Americans, the concept of God claimed by politicians 
like Kennedy is characterized by a certain theological and certain anthropological content. 
Drawing on documents from the history of the United States, Bellah describes and defines the 
civil-religious in contrast to the confessional-religious concept of God: ‘Even though he is 
somewhat deist in cast’, Bellah (for whom God is apparently a ‘he’ rather than a ‘she’) writes, 
‘he is by no means simply a watchmaker’.16 Instead, God is interested and intervenes in the fate 
of the ‘American Israel’.17 There is a relation between religion and nation that is reflected in 
Kennedy’s address: ‘The whole address can be understood as only the most recent statement of 
a theme that lies very deep in the American tradition, namely the obligation … to carry out 
God’s will on earth. This was the motivating spirit of those who founded America’.18 Bellah 
explains that this spirit can be communicated in two different ways: the one stressing America’s 
God-given rights and the other stressing America’s God-given responsibilities. Although God 
can be characterized with concrete content, the characterization is civil-religious rather than 
confessional-religious. According to Bellah, Christianity is a matter of influence rather than a 
matter of identity so that the separation of the church from the state and the state from the 
church can stay in place.19 Bellah indicates that the presence or the absence of Jesus Christ 
signifies the difference between confessional and civil religion in this case. Concentrating on 
christology, confessional religion is specific about the presence of Jesus Christ in its rhetoric. 
Concentrating on theology, civil religion is specific about the absence of Jesus Christ in its 
rhetoric. In the United States of America, then, confessional religion is predominantly Christian 
and civil religion is predominantly Christianish, so to speak. 
                                                        
14 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
15 Ibid., p. 3. 
16 Ibid., p. 7. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 5. 
19 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 




 It is stunning that a sociologist such as Bellah stresses that both civil religion and 
confessional religion are avenues to God.20 Admittedly, the sociologist speaks of a ‘reality’ that 
is transcendent rather than immanent, but his argument is theological.21 Regardless of whether 
the reality is or is not referred to as God, Bellah contends that ‘civil religion at its best is a 
genuine apprehension’ of it.22 The constraining ‘at its best’ clarifies that there is a camouflaged 
criterion to distinguish between a civil religion that is and a civil religion that is not ‘at its best’ 
in Bellah’s category. The category, then, is both descriptive and prescriptive.23 The 
camouflaged criterion is uncovered where Bellah cautions against ideological identifications of 
God. Writing during the Cold War, he warns that religion runs rogue when Americans 
instrumentalize it to distinguish the free world from the unfree world because this distinction 
closes the country off against the other.24 Due to the closure, religion is reduced to a celebration 
of the nation rather than a critique of the nation: it revels in its God-given rights, but rejects its 
God-given responsibilities. Normatively, then, it is crucial for Bellah that access to God allows 
for both the critique of the country and the celebration of the country. Openness to otherness is 
the criterion that enables Bellah to tell when civil religion is and when civil religion is not ‘at 
its best’. If Bellah’s criterion is turned from the implicit to the explicit, it draws a distinction 
between ‘uncivil’ and ‘civil’ religion. Both claims to God are communicated in a civil-religious 
rather than a confessional-religious register, but civil religion accomplishes identity through 
inclusion because it is open to a self-critique that can widen the circle of those who are 
represented by the claim, while uncivil religion accomplishes identity through exclusion 
because it is not open to a self-critique that can widen the circle of those who are represented 
by the claim.25 Correspondingly, the cohesion of civil religion is dynamic, while the cohesion 
of uncivil religion is static. Cohesion is at stake in the current cross controversy. Although the 
                                                        
20 Ibid., p. 12. See also Richey and Jones, ‘The Civil Religion Debate’, in Richey and Jones, eds, American Civil 
Religion, p. 6. 
21 Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, p. 12. 
22 Ibid. 
23 For the normativity inherent in the concept, see Philip Gorski, American Covenant: A History of Civil Religion 
from the Puritans to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 13-36. 
24 Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, p. 15. See also Bellah’s critique of Richard M. Nixon’s references to religion 
in Robert N. Bellah, ‘American Civil Religion in the 1970s’, in Richey and Jones, eds, American Civil Religion, 
pp. 255-272. 
25 To be precise, my distinction between ‘civil religion’ and ‘uncivil religion’ is analytical. In practice, civil 
religion has exclusionary elements as much as uncivil religion has inclusionary elements. In the debate of the 
1960s and the 1970s, theologians criticized the way inclusion comes at the cost of exclusion in American civil 
religion. See Charles H. Long, ‘Civil Rights – Civil Religion: Visible People and Invisible Religion’, in Richey 
and Jones, eds, American Civil Religion, pp. 211-221, who argues that ‘a great deal of the writing … on the topic 
of American religion has been consciously or unconsciously ideological, serving to … render sacred the history 
of European immigrants in this land’. Ibid., p. 212. 




cross is a confessional-religious rather than a civil-religious symbol, Bellah’s core category is 
analytically important and instructive for investigating the cross controversy.  
 In a number of statements, Söder suggested that the cross is neither Christian nor non-
Christian.26 The separation of the church from the state and of the state from the church in 
Germany’s political system (albeit less austere than in the United States) was crucial for Söder’s 
suggestions of a cultural cross.27 Instead of a religion, the cross signifies a ‘Kultur’ for Söder, 
the culture that characterizes the civilization of Europe past and present.28 The post-migrant 
context is crucial to make sense of Söder’s strange choice of the cross as a symbol for the culture 
of Europe.29 Increased immigration into Europe has kindled controversies about identity. In 
these controversies, politicians and pundits continue to contrast the values of (a rather 
imaginary) Christian culture with the values of (a rather imaginary) non-Christian culture in 
order to identify what is and what is not European.30 Often, these contrasts come with the 
essentializations that create the circular logic of the clash of cultures.31 Although Söder 
remained silent about Islam, the choice of the cross as a symbol for the historical and cultural 
identity of the country speaks to it. In a TV interview, he explained that the cross stands for 
‘tolerance’, ‘love of neighbour’, and ‘respect for human dignity’.32 If one reads the statements 
that Söder’s party published about Islam(ism) since 2015, it becomes crystal clear that the cross 
                                                        
26 See the summary, ‘CSU beschließt: Kreuze für alle Behörden’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 April 2018, available 
at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/bayern-csu-beschliesst-aufhaengen-von-kreuzen-in-behoerden-1.3956892 
[last accessed 12 May 2018]. 
27 Of course, the decree was criticized for violating this separation. However, as a former Judge from the German 
Federal Constitutional Court argued, if the cross is claimed as a symbol of culture, the separation remains intact. 
See Udo di Fabio, ‘Gott steht im Grundgesetz’, Die Zeit, 3 May 2018, available at: 
https://www.zeit.de/2018/19/religioese-symbole-kreuz-markus-soeder-saekularismus-debatte/komplettansicht 
[last accessed 12 May 2018]. 
28 See again the minutes from the meeting of the cabinet, ‘Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung vom 24. April 2018’. 
The German concept ‘Kultur’ could be rendered as ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’. For the debate about the decree, both 
connotations are crucial. 
29 Interestingly, in the two European countries that accepted most migrants during the so-called current refugee 
crisis, public and political controversies revolved around the symbol of the cross. For the so-called #mycross 
campaign in Sweden, see Johanna Gustafsson Lundberg, ‘Christianity in a Post-Christian Context: Immigration, 
Church Identity, and the Role of Religion in Public Debates’, in Schmiedel and Smith, eds, Religion in the 
European Refugee Crisis, pp. 123-143. 
30 In Germany, the debate revolves around the issue of whether Islam is or is not a part of the country: ‘Gehört der 
Islam zu Deutschland?’ In the last decade, politicians were asked for their opinions on this issue again and again. 
For studies that complicate the issue historically, empirically, and theoretically, see the contributions to Peter Antes 
and Rauf Ceylan, eds, Muslime in Deutschland: Historische Bestandsaufnahme, aktuelle Entwicklung und 
zukünftige Forschungsfragen (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017). 
31 Populists operate with the logic of Samuel P. Huntington’s clash of civilizations. See Samuel P. Huntington, 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). This logic is 
circular because the clash between religiously rooted civilizations is both its condition and its conclusion. For a 
convincing critique, see Thomas Meyer, Identitätspolitik: Vom Missbrauch kultureller Unterschiede (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 2002), pp. 92-96. 
32 The interview with Tagesthemen, aired on 26 April 2018, is available at 
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-398341.html [last accessed 12 May 2018]. 




has been chosen to pit what is considered to be Muslim (intolerance and disrespect for human 
dignity) against what is considered not to be Muslim (tolerance and respect for human 
dignity).33 The decree to display the cross in the offices of the state as a confession to the 
country’s social and legal order, then, claims that European and non-European culture—
‘Abendland’ and ‘Morgenland’—can be distinguished according to the tolerant European 
insiders who respect human dignity and the intolerant non-European outsiders who disrespect 
human dignity.34 The display of the cross in the offices of the state draws the symbolic or the 
not so symbolic line. If Bellah’s criterion is applied to the cross controversy, the decree is a 
case of uncivil rather than civil religion. Since the spectrum of meanings that the symbol of the 
cross signifies is circumscribed, it can neither accomplish the cohesion nor allow for the critique 
that Bellah calls for. Söder’s statements about the cross suggest that it is empty—indeed, he 
says that Muslims should support it—but the choice of the symbol belies his suggestion. The 
cross is claimed under the cloak of culture in order to celebrate rather than criticize the identity 
of the country as Christian.  
 The claim to uncivil rather than civil religion displays striking similarities to the patterns 
of populist politics. Of course, populism is a controversial concept. As Jan-Werner Müller 
suggests in his studies of the principles and practices of populism, the reason for the 
controversies about the concept is that populism appears democratic because its protest is aimed 
against the elites inside and outside the parliaments.35 Yet appearances are deceptive. 
According to Müller, populism is anti-democratic rather than democratic in as much as its claim 
to represent ‘the people’ is excluding rather than including. Considering a variety of cases from 
across the globe, Müller proposes that for populists ‘we are the people’ means ‘only we are the 
people’.36 ‘The people’ emerges as ethnos rather than demos.37 The populist programme, then, 
is one that demarcates insiders from outsiders through a claim to culture—which is precisely 
                                                        
33 See the publication on ‘Political Islam’ that Söder’s party published in 2016, Leitantrag Politischer Islam, 
available at https://www.csu.de/politik/beschluesse/leitantrag-politischer-islam/ [last accessed 12 May 2018]. 
34 The essentialization of the contrast between ‘Abendland’ and ‘Morgenland’—which could be rendered as 
‘occident’ and ‘orient’—is crucial to the decree. For a succinct summary of the conceptualizations of the contrast 
in the history of theology, see Reiner Anselm, ‘Abendland oder Europa? Anmerkungen aus evangelisch-
theologischer Perspektive’, Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik 57:4 (2013), pp. 272-281. See again the minutes of 
the meeting in which the cabinet decided about the decree. Here, the cross is characterized as the symbol of 
Abendland: ‘Das Kreuz ist das grundlegende Symbol der kulturellen Identität christlich-abendländischer Prägung’. 
‘Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung vom 24. April 2018’, para. 7. 
35 Jan-Werner Müller, Was ist Populismus? (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2016), pp. 14-15. 
36 Jan-Werner Müller, ‘“The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People”: Reflections on Populism’, 
Constellations 21:4 (2014), pp. 483-493, at p. 490. See also, again, Müller, Was ist Populismus?, pp. 18-22. For a 
similar concept of populism that concentrates on religion, see Nadia Marzouki and Duncan McDonnell, ‘Populism 
and Religion’, in Nadia Marzouki, Duncan McDonnell, and Olivier Roy, eds, Saving the People: How Populists 
Hijack Religion (London: Hurst, 2016), pp. 1-12. 
37 See Ulrich Schmiedel, ‘“We Can Do This!” Tackling the Political Theology of Populism’, in Schmiedel and 
Smith, eds, Religion in the European Refugee Crisis, pp. 205-224. 




what the decree to display crosses does. In the post-migrant context, it is about the exclusion 
rather than the inclusion of Muslims. Populists reduce religion to a reservoir of deeply rooted 
cultural values: in the case of Christianity these values are considered positive, thus 
characterizing the insiders (tolerance and respect for human dignity); in the case of non-
Christianity these values are considered negative, thus characterizing the outsiders (intolerance 
and disrespect for human dignity).38 In the politics of populism, then, religion can be 
characterized as a matter of ‘belonging’ rather than ‘believing’.39 Yet the Europe to which the 
populists belong is an ‘imagined community’ as classically conceptualized by Benedict 
Anderson, so that religion is—strictly speaking—a matter of ‘believing in belonging’ for 
populists.40 It is about uncivil rather than civil religion. Ideologically, it keeps the outsider 
outside and the insider inside in order to cement the circular logic of the clash of cultures that 
so much contemporary populism communicates.41 
 To summarize, Bellah distinguishes between confessional religion and civil religion. 
Drawing on the history of the United States, he suggests that civil religion ‘at its best’ is so 
open to the other that it can accomplish cohesion and allow for critique. In my analysis, 
however, the claim to Christianity in the current cross controversy comes into view as a case of 
uncivil rather than civil religion. Although it claims to be about cohesion, the cohesion is 
accomplished uncritically through the exclusion rather than critically through the inclusion of 
Islam into the country’s imagined identity. The cross controversy, I have argued, displays 
striking similarities to the patterns of populism. For churches across Europe, the populist claim 





                                                        
38 See Olivier Roy, ‘Beyond Populism: The Conservative Right, the Courts and the Churches, and the Concept of 
a Christian Europe’, in Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy, eds, Saving the People, pp. 187-188, who argues that for 
populists across Europe the account of Christianity has to be ‘nostalgic’ while the account of Islam has to be 
‘strategic’. Ibid., pp. 197-198. 
39 Roy, ‘Beyond Populism’, in Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy, eds, Saving the People, p. 193. In terms of content, 
the framework of ‘belonging’ and ‘believing’ differs from the one coined by Grace Davie, Religion in Britain 
since 1945: Believing without Belonging (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 
40 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New Edition 
(London: Verso, 2006). 
41 See again Schmiedel, ‘“We Can Do This!” Tackling the Political Theology of Populism’, in Schmiedel and 
Smith, eds, Religion in the European Refugee Crisis, pp. 205-224. 




2 Interpreting the Churches’ Response to the Cross Controversy 
with Martin Marty 
 
Martin Marty’s ‘Two Kinds of Two Kinds of Civil Religion’, published in 1974, engages 
Bellah’s conceptualization of religion critically and constructively. Bellah calls the concept of 
public theology that Marty coins ‘a major contribution to the discussion of civil religion’.42 
Applying Marty’s central concept to the cross controversy, I will analyze the responses to the 
decree by Archbishop Reinhard Marx and Bishop Heinrich Bedford-Strohm as public theology. 
In the post-migrant context, I will argue, public theology is promising because it provides a 
path out of the ‘populist predicament’. 
 According to Marty, civil religion can be considered positively and negatively: ‘liberal 
intellectuals in the academy’, Marty quips, favour or disfavour it: if the president is a liberal 
(and like them), they will consider it favourably and if the president is not a liberal (and unlike 
them), they will consider it unfavourably—they will ‘flee for cover’.43 Against the normativity 
that is arguably apparent in Bellah’s conceptualization,44 Marty insists that both civil religion 
and confessional religion should be studied according to what they set out to do rather than 
according to what scholars say they should set out to do. Marty offers a typology in which ‘there 
are two kinds of two kinds of civil religion’.45 The typology that Marty offers organizes the 
types of civil religion according to their substance and their style. Considering that Marty is 
credited with coining a new concept, it is surprising that he adds: ‘I shall eschew neologisms—
let me disappoint those who are seeking novel designations. The stress is here on common 
sense’.46 
 Substantially, Marty distinguishes between a type of civil religion in which God and the 
nation diverge and a type of civil religion in which God and the nation converge.47 Described 
differently, civil religion can communicate a God-above-the-nation on the one hand or a God-
as-the-nation on the other hand (although the identification of God with the nation implies that 
                                                        
42 Bellah, ‘American Civil Religion in the 1970s’, in Richey and Jones, eds, American Civil Religion, p. 258. 
43 Marty, ‘Two Kinds of Two Kinds of Civil Religion’, in Richey and Jones, eds, American Civil Religion, p. 142. 
44 In response to Marty, Bellah, ‘American Civil Religion in the 1970s’, in Richey and Jones, eds, American Civil 
Religion, p. 257, admits that he mixed epistemological and evaluative categories in the article in Daedalus, but 
argues that ‘the notion of civil religion … is as an analytical tool for the understanding of something that exists, 
which, like all things human, is sometimes good and sometimes bad’. 
45 Marty, ‘Two Kinds of Two Kinds of Civil Religion’, in Richey and Jones, eds, American Civil Religion, p. 144. 
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the meaning of ‘“God” is drained’, that the word appears by default rather than design).48 
Marty’s distinction is instructive for the cross controversy.  
Söder claimed that the cross is a cultural cross—non-religious rather than religious—
but had to retract his statement in response to criticism from inside and outside the churches.49 
The cross, Söder conceded, is first and foremost about religion, even though it carries cultural 
(non-religious) and political (non-religious) connotations vital to the public square.50 In 
accordance with Bellah’s category, his concession indicates that the state invests itself with the 
significance of Christianity by claiming the cross. While it would be too far-fetched to suspect 
a shift from a God-above-Bavaria to a God-as-Bavaria, the state’s claim to the cross stays 
ambiguous. Is it religious? Is it non-religious? The ambiguity implied by the identification of 
the historical and cultural identity of Europe with Christianity (and of the historical and cultural 
identity of non-Europe with non-Christianity) is exploited for political purposes by the display 
of crosses in the offices of the state. The significance of Christianity is—albeit civil-religiously 
rather than confessional-religiously—claimed for the identity of the state. 
 Stylistically, Marty distinguishes between a type of civil religion in which the 
celebration of the nation is central and a type of civil religion in which the critique of the nation 
is central.51 ‘Within each of these two kinds’, Marty argues regarding the types of a civil-
religious God-above-the-nation and a civil-religious God-as-the-nation, ‘there are two kinds of 
approaches or analyses. … Let us speak of these as “priestly” and “prophetic”’.52 Described 
differently, Marty discusses the categories of America’s God-given rights and America’s God-
given responsibilities that Bellah describes in his account of the history of the United States as 
two styles of civil religion: ‘the one comforts the afflicted; the other afflicts the comfortable’.53 
Again, Marty’s distinction is instructive for the cross controversy.  
The representatives of the state—with Söder leading the way—play at being priests 
rather than prophets. The audacity with which the crimes perpetrated in the name of the cross 
are ignored by the defenders of the decree is astonishing. In the Roman Empire, crosses and 
crucifixions communicated a ‘state terror’ that instilled fear in anyone who aimed to resist the 
Empire’s cultural, political and religious authority.54 While the shifting interpretations of the 
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cross and the striking irony of the cross as a symbol of Christian culture are obviously lost on 
Söder, his claim to the cross as a civil-religious rather than a confessional-religious symbol 
shows the risk that the reference to religion in the public sphere is running. Bellah already 
argued with regard to the confrontations of the Cold War that the priestly celebration of a 
country comes at the cost of the prophetic critique of the country.55 When the priests trump the 
prophets, the country loses religion as a reservoir for critique and self-critique. 
 Marty offers a detailed discussion of the four types of civil religion in the history of the 
United States. Interestingly, the concept of public theology that he coins in his discussion is not 
his core concern. He seems unaware of the impact his concept would have on the study of 
religion. What is public theology? According to Marty, the concept can be characterized with 
his typology, although the characterization hovers between the types.56 Public theologians opt 
for a God-above-the-nation rather than a God-as-the-nation. The nation is considered to be 
‘under God’.57 This consideration allows public theologians—exemplified by Jonathan 
Edwards, Abraham Lincoln, and Reinhold Niebuhr58—to engage in priestly celebration and 
prophetic critique concurrently.59 The combination of celebration and critique is the core 
characteristic of public theology for Marty. While the prophetic approach alone would be 
critical, but could not be received by the country and the priestly approach alone would be 
received by the country, but could not be critical, public theology ‘has to be dialectical’.60 The 
dialectics of public theology provides a path out of the populist predicament. Confronted with 
the interpretation and instrumentalization of Christianity for a construction of the identity of 
Europe that pits Christianity against Islam and Islam against Christianity, the representatives of 
the churches are caught in a plight. Criticizing the populist claim to Christianity, they are 
rebuked for renouncing their Christianity for the sake of Islam. Not criticizing the populist claim 
to Christianity, they are rebuked for renouncing Islam for the sake of Christianity. How did 
Archbishop Reinhard Marx and Bishop Heinrich Bedford-Strohm respond to the populist 
predicament? 
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2.1 Reinhard Marx’ Response 
‘One cannot decree a cross from above’ is the title of a controversial interview with Reinhard 
Marx that was published one week after the decree.61 Although the Archbishop admits that he 
is ‘pleased about the sign of the cross in public spaces’, he argues that the decree has caused 
‘division’ and ‘disturbance’ in the public and in the private life of the country, ‘down to 
families’.62 According to Marx, the state’s attempt to conquer the cross is at the core of the 
controversy. ‘The state cannot define the sign of the cross’.63 The symbol is defined neither by 
the state (against the church) nor by the church (against the state) but depends on the ‘witness 
of Christians’.64 Christianity is identified by ‘the one who died at the cross’.65 Against Söder’s 
interpretation of the cross as a sign of culture, the Archbishop insists that the content of the 
central symbol of Christianity cannot be changed at will. Since ‘one cannot have the cross 
without the man who was hung on it’, the cross is always already more than culture.66 ‘Hanging 
up a cross means: I want to orient my life towards the one who died for the world at the cross’.67 
The cross is ‘a provocation’.68 Crucially, Marx calls for a conversation about the significance 
of Christianity for the contemporary culture of the country in which both Christians and non-
Christians live.69 Although the cross contributes to culture, then, the provocation of the cross is 
aimed at Christians rather than non-Christians. It cannot be demanded or decreed for all of the 
citizens. 
 Marx shifts from a more public (and civil-religious) to a more private (and confessional-
religious) register only when he is asked: ‘What does the cross mean for you?’70  
 
It is a salutary provocation to look onto the mystery of God on the cross, onto a God 
who says: if you want to know something about me, look at Jesus of Nazareth. … 
God gives everything—even himself—because no … suffering leaves him 
unconcerned. … Therefore, one must not banalize the cross.71  
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Through a classic christological argument, Marx accentuates that God reveals Godself in Jesus 
Christ at the cross. The cross is the symbol of Christianity because it signals God’s self-
revelation in Jesus Christ. The cross thus distinguishes Christians from non-Christians. The 
distinction is so central for Marx that he argues that if one understood the cross as a cultural 
rather than a confessional symbol, ‘one would not understand it at all’.72 ‘The cross would be 
expropriated by the state.’73 Given that the government under Söder has called for resolute and 
rigorous restrictions on immigration, it is interesting how the Archbishop points to the 
significance of suffering here, although the pointer remains implicit rather than explicit.74 
Again, Marx cautions that the christological considerations are to be articulated in a framework 
that allows for both Christian and non-Christian approaches, given that in Munich, the capital 
of Bavaria, there are as many Christians as there are non-Christians.75 He invokes the state for 
this framework: ‘The state is not supposed to explain what the cross signifies’.76 On the 
contrary, according to the Archbishop, the state is supposed to guarantee that religious and non-
religious beliefs can be articulated in the public sphere, without stipulating the content of these 
beliefs.77 Countering the claim of the state to the cross, Marx concludes that the cross is neither 
a symbol for a country nor a symbol for a culture. ‘God created all human beings. It [the cross] 
is a symbol … of salvation, the salvation of the world’.78 Since it stands for salvation rather 
than the state, the cross cannot be put into a political programme. It offers orientation to those 
who work in politics, but its orientation is indirect rather than direct. 
 
2.2 Heinrich Bedford-Strohm’s Response    
Heinrich Bedford-Strohm agrees with Marx. In ‘Debates about Identity in the Church: Making 
the Meaning of the Cross Public’, he reflects on the public and political orientation offered by 
the cross.79 The article runs to about 3000 words—a mammoth for any newspaper. It was 
published three weeks after the decree, but took up statements that the Bishop had made in 
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online and offline media before.80 Martin Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation is taken as a point 
of departure.81 Since it claims that God is to be seen through the cross rather than creation, 
Bedford Strohm suggests, the Reformation opens up a new approach to theology. He cites 
Luther: ‘The theologian who looks for God’s unconcerned glory calls the bad good and the 
good bad’.82 The theology of the cross developed by Luther is crucial for the doctrine of 
justification. According to Luther, faith is not about justification because of good deeds, but 
about good deeds because of justification.83 Bedford-Strohm concludes: ‘The core of Luther’s 
spiritual revolution was the faith in the crucified God’.84 God’s love is based on God’s deed for 
humanity rather than humanity’s deed for God. It is about God’s grace. In the history of 
theology, Luther’s theology of the cross was a catalyst for the controversies between 
Protestantism and Catholicism. Although none of these controversies are addressed in his 
article, Bedford-Strohm stresses confessional-religious rather than civil-religious resources 
more than Marx. Given the make-up of Bavaria, where Protestantism is in the minority and 
Catholicism is in the majority, it makes sense that Bedford-Strohm is hesitant to claim Luther’s 
theology of the cross for state and society.  
However, Bedford-Strohm also argues that the significance of the cross for the public 
square needs to be clarified.85 He rejects arguments that pit the religious against the public or 
the public against the religious, insisting that the one is the condition for the other. Only if the 
cross is taken as a symbol of Christianity can it have significance for the public square.86 
Bedford-Strohm maintains: ‘The cross stands for a God who shows himself in the crucified’.87 
He accentuates the christological significance of the symbol of the cross to anchor a theology 
that opts for the disadvantaged rather than the advantaged.88 In the context of the government’s 
increasing restrictions on immigration, it is interesting how he concludes that ‘one only 
understands the cross…, when it prompts critical self-reflection’.89  
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Bedford-Strohm explains and evaluates a variety of positions on the role of the cross in 
the public square. Of course, there is the option of secularism—Bedford-Strohm refers to 
‘laïcité’—that confines the cross to the private rather than the public realm.90 But Bedford-
Strohm insists that it is unclear why non-religious worldviews can and religious worldviews 
cannot be communicated in public. The option of secularism offers no reasons for its 
restrictions. Accordingly, there is a place for the cross in the public square. The question is 
which and where. The cross can be used to characterize the historical imprint or the cultural 
identity of a society.91 But such characterizations, Bedford-Strohm cautions, work through 
either the explicit or the implicit exclusion of those who consider themselves not to be 
represented by the cross. Given that societies today are marked by the pluralization of religious 
and non-religious worldviews, both civil religion and not so civil religion are outdated.92 
Cohesion cannot be accomplished through the cross because in such cases either the cross 
excludes (when it is overtly Christian) or the cross is empty (when it is only Christian-ish).93 
Bedford-Strohm rejects civil religion which, according to him, always already includes civil-
religious and uncivil-religious interpretations.94 Implying that the government has moved 
towards populist politics, he points to populist invocations of the cross as abuses rather than 
uses of Christianity.95  
The significance of the cross that he confirms is called ‘öffentlich orientierend’, offering 
orientation in the public square.96 This is the one and only option for Bedford-Strohm. He 
argues that democracy requires the resource of religions in the public square. Given the 
historical and cultural character of Germany, the church and the cross are crucial to preserve 
this resource, ‘perhaps’, the Bishop adds, ‘particularly in Bavaria’.97 In accordance with the 
Archbishop, Bedford-Strohm maintains that the state cannot decide what the cross should or 
should not signify. Christianity speaks for the cross as much as the cross speaks for Christianity. 
Pointing to the Heidelberg Disputation, Bedford-Strohm insists, ‘the cross cannot be reduced 
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to a sign for the successful provision of a home (Heimat)’.98 Instead, it is ‘at least as much the 
sign of a thought-provoking challenge of all the values of the world’.99  
Both Archbishop and Bishop point to the provocative potential of the symbol of the 
cross. Yet since the provocation is voiced under pluralized and pluralizing conditions, it 
requires a conversation to which both Christians and non-Christians ought to be allowed to 
contribute. The diversity of faiths has to find its place in the public square.100 Of course, 
Christianity offers a voice in this conversation. ‘When the cross is displayed in state offices,’ 
Bedford-Strohm concludes his considerations, ‘it should recall the mystery of salvation through 
Jesus Christ’, a humanity that is dignified by the fact that ‘Christ died for all humanity’, and 
‘cultural humbleness’ rather than cultural haughtiness.101 Applying his criterion that the cross 
should cause ‘critical self-reflection’, he asks: ‘Why do we have so little success in 
communicating the Christian faith into society?’102 The question leads him into a discussion of 
the organizational and institutional challenges that the church has to confront.103 For Bedford-
Strohm, then, the decree to display the cross is also an occasion for critique of the church: if the 
cross is misunderstood, the misunderstanding shows the failures of the church. 
 
2.3 Public Theology in the Populist Predicament 
The responses to the cross controversy by the representatives of the two mainline churches in 
Germany are cases of public theology à la Marty.104 In a dialectics of the priestly celebration 
and the prophetic critique of the country, they point to the cross as a symbol that offers 
orientation for political practice because it understands the nation to be under God. What 
emerges in these responses to the cross controversy is the promise and the potential that public 
theology has for churches in the populist predicament. Public theologians like the Archbishop 
and the Bishop argue that the nation is under God. The concept of God, then, is the criterion 
that allows for what Marty calls the dialectics of the priestly and the prophetic. In the populist 
predicament, this dialectics is crucial: with the prophetic critique, the public theologian can 
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tackle the rebuff that the church prioritizes Christianity at the cost of Islam; with the priestly 
celebration, the public theologian can tackle the rebuff that the church prioritizes Islam at the 
cost of Christianity; and with the dialectics of both, public theology provides a path out of the 
populist predicament.  
In the case of the cross controversy, the representatives of the churches translated the 
dialectics of the prophetic and the priestly into a two-track argumentation. Neither Archbishop 
nor Bishop opposed the decree altogether.105 Against the interpretation of the cross by the state, 
they pointed to the cross as confessional rather than cultural. Against the instrumentalization of 
the cross by the state, they pointed to contemporary culture as both Christian and non-Christian. 
Christianity, then, cannot be at the centre of the state’s identity construction. But in the 
conversation of Christians and non-Christians, Christianity can make a crucial contribution—
with or without the sign of the cross. 
To summarize, Marty distinguished the references to religion in the public square 
according to substance and style in order to develop a typology of civil religions. His aim was 
to return the discussion about Bellah’s category from the prescriptive to the descriptive. Bellah 
welcomed Marty’s critique and contribution, particularly the concept of public theology that 
Marty proposed in passing. Public theology understands the nation to be under God which 
underscores the dialectics of prophetic critique and priestly celebration. In the context of what 
I have called the populist predicament, public theology is crucial because it celebrates and 
criticizes Christianity concurrently. For churches across Europe, then, public theology can 
answer the complex and critical challenge of the populist claim to Christianity. 
 
 
3 Intervening in the Cross Controversy: The Pluralization of Public 
Theology  
 
Public theology is a promising and pertinent way to respond to the populist predicament. 
Building on Bellah, I have analyzed and assessed populism as a phenomenon that runs on 
‘uncivil religion’ rather than ‘civil religion’. For populists, religion is crucial for the contrast 
between insiders and outsiders that is construed through a claim to the strong and stable identity 
of a country. In the case of the cross controversy, identity is shaped and sharpened through the 
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exclusion rather than the inclusion of the other, identified with Islam. The consequence is a 
static rather than a dynamic cohesion of the country. If churches respond to the interpretation 
and instrumentalization of Christianity for populist politics, they are confronted with the 
challenge that I have called the ‘populist predicament’: too much critique of Christianity will 
lead to an assessment of them favouring Islam at the cost of Christianity and too much 
celebration of Christianity will lead to an assessment of them favouring Christianity at the cost 
of Islam. I have argued the programme of public theology that Marty proposed in passing 
provides a promising response to the populist predicament, because it is by definition 
dialectical: when rebuked for too much celebration, public theologians can point to their 
critique and when rebuked for too much critique, public theologians can point to celebration. 
In the case of the cross controversy, the interventions by Reinhard Marx and Heinrich Bedford-
Strohm indicate the significance of public theology to confront populist politics in the post-
migrant context. Of course, both the Archbishop and the Bishop were charged with criticisms 
that they strengthen Christianity at the cost of Islam or that they strengthen Islam at the cost of 
Christianity. Yet, in a way, these criticisms only confirm how challenging and complex the 
populist predicament is for churches in the post-migrant context.  
In a theological critique of the churches, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf proposes that the 
decree to display crosses in the offices of the state causes a banalization of the central symbol 
of Christianity.106 The representatives of the churches, he persists, have not opposed this 
banalization firmly and forcefully enough.107 Dogmatically, Graf criticizes the way the 
representatives talk about the cross as a symbol for theology. While it sounds sensible to 
theologians to suggest that seeing the cross should evoke a sense of mystery, it is unclear where 
the sense of mystery would come from when one sees a cross while one joins the queues in the 
overcrowded waiting area of a state office in order to fill in paper work.108 Hence, while the 
interventions might be meaningful for theologians, the meaning is lost in the concrete case. 
Ethically, Graf criticizes the way the representatives talk about the cross as a symbol for 
anthropology. Again, while it sounds sensible to theologians to suggest that seeing the cross 
should call politicians to act in a way that respects the dignity of all human beings, it is no 
guarantee for such actions. ‘Will the Bishop pray for the crosses to fall down’, Graf asks, when 
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these politicians ratify further restrictions on immigration with inhumane consequences?109 
Hence, again, while the interventions might be meaningful for theologians, the meaning is lost 
in the concrete case. Graf’s insistence on the day-to-day consequences of the display of the 
cross is both challenging and convincing. In contrast to the representatives of the churches who 
accepted the decree but amended the definition of the cross, he calls for a firm and forceful 
critique. The churches ought to oppose the decree to display crosses in all offices of the state 
of Bavaria at all cost. Is public theology, as Graf seems to suggest, a dead-end? Is it theoretically 
feasible but practically unfeasible? Is it a theological pipe dream?  
By way of conclusion, I will respond to the practical problem by returning to the 
conversation between Robert Bellah and Martin Marty. Already in the 1960s and 1970s, both 
of them argued that public theology could be central for the future of civil and not so civil 
religion in the public square. Bellah calls for a ‘world civil religion’.110 His core concern is ‘that 
we open our search … beyond the ambit of our own tradition’ so as to connect different and 
diverse traditions in a ‘movement toward human liberation’.111 If religions are civil rather than 
uncivil—which is to say, open to the other—such liberation should be a possible and a practical 
project.112 Marty is a little more cautious and a little more careful. In response to Bellah, he 
suggests that the future can draw neither only on universalized (civil) religion nor only on 
particularized (confessional) religion.113 Given that universalization does not take the distinct 
theological content of individual traditions seriously while particularization does not take the 
diverse sociological contexts of individual traditions seriously, the ‘future belongs, no doubt, 
to neither but only both’.114 But in spite of their different programmes and their distinct 
prognoses, both scholars see the promise of public theology for the future. As Bellah argues,  
 
A variety of interpretations, even a cumulative tradition of interpretation, is not 
inconsistent with the openness of civil religious transcendence as long as no public 
theological position is institutionalized as a civil religious orthodoxy. Indeed, a 
variety of public theologies is a guarantee of the openness of civil religion.115 
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Accordingly, public theologies—in the plural rather than the singular—are crucial to keep 
religion in the public square open to the other. Openness to otherness, then, is the criterion that 
demands and defines a pluralist position of public theology.  
In the case of the cross controversy, both the Archbishop and the Bishop have called for 
a conversation of non-Christians and Christians about the significance of religion for 
contemporary culture. However, the call for a conversation is not a conversation. Although the 
church leaders accept that contemporary culture is pluralized and pluralizing, they never 
question whether the sign of the cross in the offices of the state might communicate a claim to 
the cultural hegemony and the cultural homogeneity of Christianity.116 But if the core concern 
of public theologians is to keep the culture of the country open, the cross cannot be the only 
symbol. If they would take their call for a conversation of Christians and non-Christians 
seriously, the Christian representatives would have to call for the display of non-Christian 
symbols (as much as the non-Christian representatives would have to call for the display of 
Christian symbols). Public theology would have to be pluralized. 
Crucially, the pluralist position of public theology might suffice to respond to Graf’s 
critique of the representatives of the churches in terms of dogmatics and ethics. Imagine the 
cross was displayed together with the symbols of all Abrahamic religions. Dogmatically, the 
three symbols might still not evoke a sense of mystery while one queues in overcrowded waiting 
areas. However, in combination, they might provoke considerations or conversations about the 
significance of these symbols for the mystery of God. Ethically, the three symbols might still 
not guarantee that the government will adhere to the humanitarian impulses of the three 
Abrahamic religions. However, in combination, they might provoke considerations or 
conversations about the significance of these symbols for the rules that persons from different 
backgrounds live by, for their convergences, their divergences, and their contribution to 
personal and communal ways of life. The conversations between Christians and non-Christians 
that the Bishop and the Archbishop call for, then, could be the consequence of the pluralization 
of public theology.  
The pluralist position—Christian representatives opting for non-Christian symbols and 
non-Christian representatives opting for Christian symbols—would be central to the practice of 
public theology. Theologically, the considerations and conversations could communicate that 
civil religion is like confessional religion ‘at its best a genuine apprehension of God’.117 
                                                        
116 For a convincing critique of the tacit and not so tacit claims to cultural hegemony and cultural homogeneity in 
Christian public and political theology, see Jayne Svenungsson, ‘Public Faith and the Common Good: A Radical 
Messianic Proposal’, Political Theology 14:6 (2013), pp. 744-757. 
117 Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, p. 12. 




Sociologically, the considerations and conversations could turn the offices of the state where 
symbols are shown in combination into laboratories for the post-migrant context. Such 
conflictual negotiation and continuous re-negotiation of identity is a condition for a 
construction of identity that includes rather than excludes the other. If post-migrant societies 
are about conversation, public theology needs to support these conversations, however 
conflictual and however controversial they might be. In these conversations, openness to 
otherness does not mean that public theologians cannot argue for the significance of ‘their’ 
symbols. But it does mean that they cannot stop there.118  
                                                        
118 I am grateful for the comments and criticisms that I received from Lukas Meyer, Hannah Strømmen and the 
two anonymous peer-reviewers. 
